Security Disclosure and Bug Bounty Program History

Filecoin's security model depends on the correctness of complex cryptographic proofs, a novel virtual machine (FVM), and a global network of storage providers running heterogeneous client implementations. The Filecoin Bug Bounty Program serves as a critical feedback loop, incentivizing independent security researchers to identify and responsibly disclose vulnerabilities before they can be exploited in production. This page provides a transparent historical record of the program's most impactful disclosures, building confidence in the disclosure process and offering a technical reference for the types of bugs that have been found and fixed across the protocol's stack.

The vulnerability classes documented here span the full Filecoin architecture: from soundness bugs in zk-SNARK circuits and Proof of Replication/Spacetime implementations that could allow fake storage power, to FVM actor logic bugs enabling state corruption or fund lockups, and gas metering vulnerabilities in the WASM runtime that could lead to denial-of-service. Each entry captures the specific component affected—whether a built-in actor, a cryptographic library like bellperson or rust-fil-proofs, or a client implementation like Lotus or Venus—along with the severity rating, the fix timeline, and the bounty payout awarded.

For storage providers, node operators, and FVM developers, this history serves as a practical threat model. Understanding the bug classes that have historically escaped internal review—such as incorrect state transitions in the Storage Market actor, signature validation confusion between BLS and SECP256K1 address types, or resource exhaustion vectors in the libp2p gossip layer—helps teams prioritize their own security review and monitoring efforts. The record also demonstrates the effectiveness of the coordinated disclosure process, where critical patches are developed, tested on calibration-net, and deployed via network upgrades without exposing mainnet users to unnecessary risk.

Chainscore Labs helps protocol teams, providers, and FVM builders apply these historical patterns to their own security posture. Our protocol impact assessments and smart contract review services are informed by the vulnerability classes documented here, ensuring that new integrations and actor deployments are hardened against known failure modes. When a new disclosure occurs, our incident response support helps teams rapidly assess whether their operations or contracts are affected and validate the remediation steps against the canonical fix.

Filecoin's bug bounty program has surfaced a distinct set of vulnerability classes that reflect the protocol's unique architecture: a complex proof-of-storage system, a WASM-based virtual machine (FVM), and a multi-implementation network. The most impactful disclosures cluster around cryptographic proof flaws—soundness bugs in zk-SNARK circuits that could allow a malicious storage provider to generate valid proofs for invalid or missing sectors—and actor logic errors in the built-in smart contracts governing storage deals, sector lifecycle, and miner power accounting. These classes are existential because they strike at the core security assumption of the network: that storage power is backed by real, unique, retrievable data.

A second critical class involves state-machine inconsistencies between Lotus, Venus, and Forest implementations. Divergent handling of edge cases in the FVM runtime, gas metering, or syscall interfaces has historically led to unintentional chain forks, where nodes running different clients disagree on the canonical state. The bounty program has also rewarded disclosures of resource exhaustion vectors targeting node RPC endpoints, libp2p gossip protocols, and the sealing pipeline—attacks that can prevent storage providers from submitting WindowPoSt proofs within the required deadline, triggering mass sector faulting and slashing penalties. Signature and address confusion attacks exploiting the coexistence of BLS and SECP256K1 schemes, and f1/f3/f4 address types, represent a persistent integration risk for exchanges and custody providers.

For operators and builders, the historical disclosure record serves as a threat model. Storage providers should harden their proving infrastructure against the specific WindowPoSt disruption patterns that have been rewarded. FVM developers must audit their contracts for the actor logic bugs and gas metering edge cases that have appeared in built-in actors. Exchange and wallet teams should validate their address handling and signature verification logic against the confusion attacks documented in the program. Chainscore Labs helps teams operationalize these lessons through targeted security reviews that map bounty program findings to their specific integration architecture, ensuring that known vulnerability classes are systematically addressed before they become incidents.